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Abstract
What role does data play in competition? This question has been at the center
of a fierce debate around competition policy in the digital economy. We use a
competition-in-utilities approach to provide a general framework for studying the
competitive effects of data, encompassing a wide range of markets where data
has many different uses. We identify conditions for data to be unilaterally pro-
or anti-competitive (UPC or UAC). The conditions are simple and often require
no information about market demand. We apply our framework to study various
applications of data, including training algorithms, targeting advertisements, and
personalizing prices. We also show that whether data is UPC or UAC has important
implications for policy issues such as data-driven mergers, market structure, and
privacy policy.
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1 Introduction
Data has become one of the most important issues in the ongoing vivid debate about
competition and regulation in the digital economy. This is illustrated by recent policy
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reports (e.g., Crémer et al., 2019; Furman et al., 2019; Scott Morton et al., 2019), policy
hearings (such as the FTC’s recent Hearing on Privacy, Big Data, and Competition1),
and newly established specialist policy teams (such as the UK CMA’s Data, Technology,
and Analytics unit). The idea that firms would seek to gather information about their
consumers and market environment is not new, but today’s situation stands out by the
scale and scope of the data collected, along with its importance to many of the most
successful technology firms’ business models.
Firms have found many uses for the data they collect or acquire, be it targeted
advertising, price-discrimination, or product improvement (e.g. better search results,
more personalized product recommendations), often through the help of machine learning
algorithms. While observers acknowledge the various efficiencies Big Data brings about,
many concerns remain. A first concern is that data may hamper effective competition, by
raising barriers to entry or by creating winner-take-all situations (see e.g. Furman et al.,
2019, 1.71 to 1.79). A second, related, concern is that dominant firms may also engage in
exclusionary conduct related to data, by refusing to provide access to data to other firms,
by signing exclusive contracts or by employing tying and cross-usage agreements (Autorité
de la Concurrence and Bundeskartellamt, 2016, pp 17-20). A third broad concern is
exploitative behavior, when a firm either uses its dominant position to collect excessive
amounts of data (see the recent Facebook case by the German Bundeskartellamt) or uses
its data to extract surplus from consumers (Scott Morton et al. (2019), p.37: “[Big Data]
enables firms to charge higher prices (for goods purchased and for advertising) and engage
in behavioral discrimination, allowing platforms to extract more value from users where
they are weak”). Finally, an increasing number of mergers in the digital sector involve
data (see Argentesi et al., 2019, for recent cases), and there is still a debate as to how such
data-driven mergers should be tackled by competition authorities (Grunes and Stucke,
2016).
The importance of data to the digital economy has led to a rapidly growing economics
literature (see below for a discussion). Most papers in that literature focus on one kind of
data use (e.g. price-discrimination, targeted advertising) and on a narrow set of issues
(e.g. exclusive deals, mergers, evolution of market structure). While the correspondingly
detailed modelling has allowed researchers to uncover and understand some novel economic
mechanisms that apply to some specific situations, one drawback of this approach is that
the connection between the various models and issues is not always clear.
In this paper we propose a framework that allows a unified approach to the various
usages of data, and we derive a number of results related to the policy issues mentioned
above. We consider a model where firms compete in the utility-space. This approach is
flexible enough to encompass various business models, such as price competition (with
1See https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/events-calendar/ftc-hearing-6-competition-
consumer-protection-21st-century, accessed 1 May 2019
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uniform or personalized prices), ad-supported business models, or competition in quality.
Inspired by Armstrong and Vickers (2001)’s work on price-discrimination, we model data
as a revenue-shifting input: for a given utility provided, a better dataset enables a firm
to generate more revenue from each consumer, a natural property across many uses of
data. Our first main result consists in characterizing the environments where data is
unilaterally pro-competitive (or unilaterally anti-competitive), in the sense that a better
dataset induces a firm to offer more (or less) utility to consumers. We show that in many
cases the pro or anticompetitive nature of data can be assessed without making specific
assumptions about the shape of the demand function,2 but instead depends only on the
mapping between utility and revenue (Proposition 1). We apply the result to various
examples inspired by standard models of data usage.
This preliminary static analysis, which only relies on the revenue-shifting property
of data, serves as a building block for the rest of the paper. We then consider other
properties of data to study various issues.
First, we study data-driven mergers. We consider two adjacent markets: the data
generated on the (monopolized) market A can be used by the firms who compete on
market B. Here, data is a byproduct of activity on market A, and thus depends positively
on the utility offered to consumers on that market. We look at a merger between the
monopolist on market A and one of the B competitors, and study in particular how the
merger may affect the incentives of firm A to collect data by providing utility to consumers.
In this context, a specificity of data is that it may not be possible for firm A to license its
data to a B firm absent the merger, either because of regulatory constraints or contractual
frictions. We show that whether data trade is possible without the merger is an important
factor, along with the pro- or anti-competitive nature of data, in determining if the merger
benefits consumers.
Next, we turn to the study of the link between data and market structure by considering
a dynamic model where data generated by a sale in one period can be used in later periods.
We show that a necessary condition for data to lead to market dominance or to deter
entry is that it is unilaterally pro-competitive. While fairly intuitive, this point — which
to the best of our knowledge had not been explicitly made — indicates a tension between
the static and the dynamic effects of data on market outcomes, which could constitute a
guide for practitioners.
Finally, we introduce consumer privacy concerns in a model of data collection by a
monopolist. Our baseline model can accommodate such a situation, with the potential
tweak that collecting more data may reduce the firm’s revenue for a given utility provided.
We show that the firm may collect too little or too much data depending on whether
data is unilaterally pro- or anti-competitive. In this context, a potential friction may
be that consumers cannot observe how much data is collected or sold to third parties
2Apart from standard regularity assumptions.
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(resulting in privacy costs). Another source of inefficiency lies in the data externalities
among consumers: data about a consumer may help a firm learn something about others.
We discuss various policy interventions: restrictions on the amount of data collected,
increased consumer control of data collection, increased transparency. While the first two
policies work well when data is unilaterally anti-competitive, they are ineffective and can
even backfire when data is pro-competitive. Transparency offers more flexibility when
data is unilaterally pro-competitive, and may achieve the second-best optimum.
Contribution In summary, our contribution is two-fold. Firstly, by casting data as
a revenue-shifter into a competition-in-utility model, we provide an analysis that is not
closely tied to a specific use of data, answering calls for a more general understanding
of the competitive effects of data (e.g., Economist, 2017; Furman et al., 2019). In this
model, we give conditions for data to be unilaterally pro- or anti-competitive, that hold
irrespective of the chosen discrete-choice model specification. By applying this analysis to
various “off-the-shelf” models in which data is used in a specific way, we illustrate the
versatility and usefulness of the approach, which connect firms’ business model to the
competitive effects of data.
Secondly, we rely on this framework to generate new insights about several important
policy issues related to competition in the presence of data (data-driven mergers, evolution
of market structure, privacy), contributing to an ongoing policy debate in this area.
Roadmap After a brief discussion of the related literature, we present the basic frame-
work in Section 2. In Section 3 we discuss various applications of the basic framework. We
then turn to the issues of data-driven mergers in Section 4, of dynamic market structure
in Section 5, and of privacy in Section 6.
Related Literature
The economic literature has not yet developed a coherent general framework for the
analysis of data and competition. One reason is that data takes many forms and has
many different users and uses (see Acquisti et al., 2016, for a discussion of this point).
Much of the literature has therefore focused on the study of particular applications of
data. For example, active literatures consider the consequences of allowing firms to use
data to price discriminate (e.g., Thisse and Vives, 1988; Fudenberg and Tirole, 2000;
Taylor, 2004; Acquisti and Varian, 2005; Calzolari and Pavan, 2006; Anderson et al.,
2016; Belleflamme and Vergote, 2016; Kim et al., 2018; Montes et al., 2018; Bonatti and
Cisternas, 2019; Chen et al., forthcoming; Gu et al., 2019; Ichihashi, forthcoming) or
target ads (e.g., Roy, 2000; Iyer et al., 2005; Galeotti and Moraga-González, 2008; Athey
and Gans, 2010; Bergemann and Bonatti, 2011; Rutt, 2012; Johnson, 2013; Bergemann
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and Bonatti, 2015; de Cornière and de Nijs, 2016). In both cases, the competitive effects of
data appear ambiguous—depending on both how data is used and the specific modelling
assumptions made. Thus, while these papers shed light on the relationship between data
and competitive outcomes in some particular situations, it is hard to distil from the
literature a single overall message about data’s competitive effects. In this paper we adopt
a competition-in-utilities approach à la Armstrong and Vickers (2001)3 to build a model
that is agnostic about how data is used. This approach allows us to provide more general
results on the economic and competitive effects of data across a range of contexts. It also
helps us highlight how specific assumptions can drive important market outcomes. For
example, in a model of ad targeting we show that a simple change to the way ad platforms
compete can drastically alter the competitive effects of data.
Armed with this framework, we turn our attention to various policy issues related to
data. One important contemporary question concerns the control of mergers involving the
exchange of data. A few papers (Kim and Choi, 2010; Esteves and Vasconcelos, 2015; Kim
et al., 2018) study this question, in models where data is used for price-discrimination
purposes. Prat and Valletti (2019) consider mergers between media platforms offering
slots for targeted advertising. By contrast, our framework allows us to discuss the effects
of a data-driven merger depending on the way data is used. While related to the literature
on vertical integration (Riordan, 2005), a data-driven merger differs from a standard
vertical one: both the “upstream” and the “downstream” firms in our model may face the
same set of consumers, and in some cases a merger is the only way to transfer the input
(data) among firms.
Another important theme in the policy debate concerns the relationship between data
use or accumulation and market structure. Building on the literature on learning by doing
and dynamic network effects (e.g., Cabral and Riordan, 1994; Mitchell and Skrzypacz,
2005), recent papers such as Prüfer and Schottmüller (2017) and Hagiu and Wright (2020)
study long-run market dynamics when data-enabled learning helps firms improve their
products. These papers take the use of data (product improvement) as given and focus on
how firms’ learning process can generate data-driven network effects. We also study the
relationship between data and market evolution, but instead focus on the role of different
business models or different uses of data in driving different dynamic outcomes.
Lastly, a literature has emerged to study issues related to privacy regulation and
property rights over personal data. Examples include Hermalin and Katz (2006), Campbell
et al. (2015), Casadesus-Masanell and Hervas-Drane (2015), Kim and Wagman (2015),
Acemoglu et al. (2019), Bergemann et al. (2019), Choi et al. (2019), Dosis and Sand-
Zantman (2019), Jann and Schottmüller (2019) and Ichihashi (2020). Common questions
addressed in this literature include whether the market under-provides privacy or whether
naive consumers are vulnerable to the exploitation of their data. Taking a different
3See Bliss (1988) for an earlier use of this approach.
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approach, we use our framework to study the relationship between data and competition
in the presence of consumer privacy concerns. This allows us to analyze how various
common proposals for data protection policies affect not only consumer privacy outcomes,
but also wider competition in the market.
2 The competitive effects of data
2.1 Model description
Competition in utility Consider a discrete choice model where n firms, indexed by
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, compete in utility (à la Armstrong and Vickers, 2001): each firm chooses an
average utility level ui, and the utility that consumer l obtains from firm i is uil = ui + εil.
Depending on the context, ui may depend on firm i’s price, on its quality, or on any of its
strategic choices (such as the “ad load” that a media firm imposes on viewers). The fixed
cost of choosing ui is C(ui).
4 The shocks ε follow a joint distribution G, which we assume
is continuously differentiable and such that E[εil] = 0. The corresponding demand for firm
i is denoted Di(u), where u ≡ (u1, . . . , un), such that ∂Di(u)∂ui > 0 and
∂Di(u)
∂uj
< 0 for j 6= i.
While this competition in utility framework restricts consumer heterogeneity, it is
consistent with some standard discrete-choice models, such as the multinomial or nested
logit models.
Data Each firm has access to a dataset containing information about (actual or potential)
consumers’ characteristics, market demand, etc. The data available to each firm may differ
in terms of scale, scope, accuracy or recency. We assume that all these characteristics
determine the “quality” of the dataset available to firm i, and denote such quality by
δi ∈ R+.
There are two ways to interpret δi. Firstly, it might measure the aggregate data held
by i about the overall population of consumers. Having such data might enable the firm to
provide a better offer to all consumers by, for example, making product recommendations
based on the choices or feedback of past customers. Alternatively, the δi might measure
the amount of data the firm has about a single specific consumer, in which case ui is
interpreted as a personalized offer to that consumer and each consumer is treated as a
separate market, buying from i with probability Di(u).
4In Armstrong and Vickers (2001), C(ui) = 0, which holds when ui depends on firm i’s price only.
With investments in quality, one may have C ′(ui) > 0. When strategies are multi-dimensional, C might
depend on the way in which utility is provided. For instance, an increase in quality entails a cost, unlike
a decrease in price. We return to this issue below, but for the moment assume that the strategic choice is
uni-dimensional.
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The per-consumer revenue of firm i is a function of its mean utility ui as well as of the
quality of its data δi. We denote such function by ri(ui, δi).
The key assumption of our model is the following:
Assumption 1. A firm with a better dataset (i.e. a higher δi) generates more revenue
for any given utility level provided to consumers: ∂ri(ui,δi)
∂δi
≥ 0.
In other words, the quality of a dataset is measured by its potential to generate revenue.
This way of introducing data in a competition-in-utilities approach allows us to flexibly
analyze a variety of different business models and technologies for using data—each
corresponding to a different relationship between ui, δi, and ri. For illustrative purposes,
let us briefly and informally sketch one example application (this and several others are
developed more completely in Section 3). Suppose firms set prices pi for personalized
products. The more data the firm has, the better can it personalize the product so that a
consumer’s value for the product, v(δi), is increasing. We might then have ui = v(δi)− pi.
This implies the firm’s per-consumer revenue is r(ui, δi) ≡ pi = v(δi)− ui.
Firms simultaneously choose their ui to maximize profit
π(u, δi) = ri(ui, δi)Di(u)− C(ui), (1)
which we assume to be quasi-concave in ui for any u−i, δi.
We also introduce the following definition:
Definition 1. Firms have constant fixed costs if C ′(ui) = 0 for all ui.
In the previous example the per-user revenue ri is a decreasing function of ui. While
this may seem intuitive when firms compete in prices for instance, there are natural
environments in which higher utilities are associated with higher per-consumer revenues
for firms. de Cornière and Taylor (2019) define environments with “congruent payoffs”
such that ∂ri
∂ui
> 0, in contrast to “conflicting payoffs” where ∂ri
∂ui
< 0. A useful result from
that paper can be stated as follows:
Lemma 1. Suppose that ∂
2Di
∂ui∂uj




and strategic substitutes if ∂ri
∂ui
> 0.
The assumption that ∂
2Di
∂ui∂uj
= 0 is of course a restriction, but it applies to the
Hotelling-Salop discrete-choice models.
2.2 Unilateral effects of data
We begin by studying how data affects firms’ incentives to offer utility, treating δi as an
exogenous parameter. We will later endogenize δi by considering various ways that data
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is obtained as a by-product of economic activity, starting in Section 5.
Let ûi(u−i, δi) be firm i’s best-response function. We use the following definition.





We say that data is unilaterally anti-competitive (UAC) when the inequality is reversed.
This notion of pro- or anti-competitiveness of data captures the “unilateral” effect of
data: data is UPC if better data induces a firm to offer more utility to consumers ceteris
paribus. It is incomplete in two ways: first, it does not capture the equilibrium effects
of data. Second, it is a static notion. However, we will see that this unilateral property
plays a key role in determining the effects of data, both on equilibrium (Propositions 2.A
and 2.B) and on market dynamics (Section 5).
Firm i’s best-response is increasing in δi if and only if
∂2πi(u,δi)
∂ui∂δi
> 0. Given the
expression for firm i’s profit, (1), its best response function, ûi(u−i, δi), is found as the
























Di(u) ≥ 0 (3)
Our first result gives a sufficient and a necessary-and-sufficient condition for data to be
unilaterally pro-competitive:
Proposition 1. 1. If ∂
2r(ui,δi)
∂ui∂δi
≥ 0, data is unilaterally pro-competitive for firm i.





Data affects the incentive to provide utility in two ways. Firstly, an extra unit of
data increases the marginal revenue earned from an additional consumer and therefore
the incentive to attract consumers with high utility offers. This corresponds to the first
term in (3), which is always positive. Secondly, data may affect the opportunity cost (or
benefit) of providing utility to a consumer. For example, the opportunity cost of showing
consumers fewer ads is higher the more precisely targeted the foregone ads would have
been. This gives rise to the second term in (3), whose sign is ambiguous.
Part 1 of Proposition 1 follows immediately from the fact that only the second term
of (3) has an ambiguous sign. Part 2 is found by using the first-order condition, (2), to
eliminate D from (3). In both cases we obtain a condition that does not depend on D so
that precise knowledge of the shape of demand is often not necessary in order to assess the
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competitive effects of data. Instead, what is most important is the economic technology, r,
that connects data, utility, and revenue. This technology will be driven by the particular
way in which data is being used.
Proposition 1 leads quite naturally to results on equilibrium utility offers. Under
monopoly (n = 1), the sign of ∂u
∗
∂δ
is given directly by the sign of (3). For n > 1, the








∣∣∣∣ < 0, (4)
which guarantees the equilibrium is unique.5 Then the following proposition describes
how data affects the utility that is provided in equilibrium.
Proposition 2.A. Suppose firms are symmetric (δi ≡ δ) and (4) holds. In the unique
(symmetric) equilibrium, utility offers are increasing in δ if and only if data is unilaterally
pro-competitive.
Proposition 2.B. Suppose n = 2 and (4) holds. In the unique equilibrium, if data is
unilaterally pro-competitive (anti-competitive) then
1. u∗i ≥ u∗j (u∗i ≤ u∗j) when δi ≥ δj;
2. an increase in δi causes u
∗
i to increase (decrease);
3. an increase in δi causes u
∗
j to increase (decrease) if utilities are strategic complements,
and decrease (increase) if they are strategic substitutes.
Under symmetry, an increase in δ causes the equilibrium point to shift along the 45◦
line in the same direction as firms’ best responses (up if data is pro-competitive and down
otherwise)—see Figure 1. When only one firm’s δi increases, that i’s utility offer moves
in the same direction as its best response shift (up if data is pro-competitive and down
otherwise). The equilibrium point then moves along the rival’s best response function so
that the two firms’ offers move in the same direction if the situation is one of strategic
complements, and in opposite directions when utilities are strategic substitutes. Figure 2
illustrates.
3 Applications to product personalization, ad target-
ing, and price discrimination
The analysis has so far been conducted in terms of an abstract parameter δi, which could
be interpreted as any factor that shifts r. One thing that makes the application to data




















Figure 1: An increase in δ1 ≡ δ2 ≡ δ cause equilibrium utility offers to increase when




















Figure 2: An increase in δ2 causes the equilibrium u
∗
2 to increase when data is pro-
competitive. The effect on u∗1 depends on whether the game has strategic substitutes (left
panel), or complements (right panel).
particularly interesting is that relatively standard models of data use naturally generate
both pro- and anti-competitive effects. Here we apply the framework to some of the main
ways data is used (product improvement or personalization, targeted advertising, and
price discrimination) and show how the model can be used to determine the competitive
effects of data in each case.
3.1 Product improvement
One important use of data is to improve the quality of the products or services offered by
firms. For instance, search engine algorithms use data about past queries to improve their
results. This improvement can also take the form of more personalized recommendations
without affecting the quality of the underlying products: a movie streaming service
suggesting shows to its users based on their viewing history, or an online retailer suggesting
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products to consumers based on past purchases.
We already discussed a reduced-form model of product improvement in Section 2.1.
To recap: suppose a firm charges pi for a product that consumers value at v(δi), which is
increasing.6 We then have ui = v(δi)− pi and hence r(ui, δi) ≡ pi = v(δi)− ui. Because
∂2r(ui,δi)
∂ui∂δi
= 0, Proposition 1 tells us that data is unilaterally pro-competitive in this case.
Intuitively, if data is used to improve the product then the firm can charge a higher price
while providing a given level of utility. This high price increases the firm’s marginal
incentive to attract consumers, inducing it to increase ui.
We can extend this result using the more general framework of demand-shifting (Cowan,
2004).7 In this broader class of models, each consumer who picks firm i buys q(pi, δi) units
of its product, q being non-decreasing in δi (equivalently, we could formulate the model
starting from the inverse demand function P (qi, δi)). The utility that a consumer obtains
from choosing i is the standard consumer surplus: ui =
∫∞
pi
q(x, δi)dx. Inverting this
equation we obtain the price (and hence r(ui, δi)) associated with a given ui. In Appendix
B.1 we show that data is unilaterally pro-competitive when it is used to improve products
in such a way as to induce an additive or multiplicative shift in the per-consumer demand.
More precisely:
Result 1. Suppose φ is a non-increasing function satisfying φ′(·) +xφ′′(·) ≤ 0. Then data
is unilaterally pro-competitive if any of the following conditions hold: (i) q(p, δ) = δ+φ(p),
(ii) q(p, δ) = δφ(p), (iii) P (q, δ) = δ + φ(q), or (iv) P (q, δ) = δφ(q).
Moreover, in this class of applications we have ∂ri
∂ui
< 0, meaning that, by Lemma 1,





Another major use of data is to facilitate the targeting of advertising. Suppose that the
firms are media platforms that face an inverse demand for advertising slots P (ni, δi),
decreasing in the number of ad slots, ni. Having more data allows firms to better target
ads, so P is increasing in δi. For example, according to an industry report, the price of
advertising to a user of the Safari web browser has fallen 60% since it started blocking
access to users’ data.8 Suppose that there is a one-to-one mapping between the number
of ads shown by firm i and the utility ui, so that the number of ads corresponding to
6This reduced-form can be given a microfoundation: suppose each firm is a multi-product retailer
of experience goods (e.g., movies or books). Each consumer has an ideal product, θ, and experiences a
mismatch from product x such that she values x at V − (x − θ)2. Each firm obtains a signal, si that
is distributed according to N (θ, 1δi ). After observing si, the best that firm i can do is to recommend
product s. The value when choosing firm i is then v(δi) = V − E[(s− θ)2] = V − 1δ2i .
7Cowan (2004) only considers symmetric demand shifters, and does not look at the equilibrium utility
provision.
8See https://www.theinformation.com/articles/apples-ad-targeting-crackdown-shakes-
up-ad-market, accessed 10 December 2019.
11
ui is n(ui). Then the firm’s revenue is r(ui, δi) = n(ui)P (n(ui), δi). We consider two
formulations of this model corresponding to different assumptions about n(ui).
Firstly, suppose that consumers dislike seeing ads—a common assumption in the
literature (e.g., Anderson and Coate, 2005). Then n′(ui) < 0 in this case. Assuming that
fixed costs are constant and using Proposition 1 (2) yields:
Result 2. In the targeted advertising application with n′(ui) < 0, data is unilaterally
anti-competitive if and only if ∂
2 ln[P (ni,δi)]
∂ni∂δi





As in the preceding application we have ∂ri
∂ui
< 0, at least in the relevant region where
the number of ads shown by each firm is below the monopoly level (i.e. maximizing




Secondly, in the so-called “attention economy” the key advertising bottleneck is often
not the number of ads that can be shown to a consumer, but the consumer’s willingness to
pay attention to them. Suppose that ui measures the quality of a firm’s content (chosen at
cost C(ui)). Consumers spend more time (or attention) on a platform with better content
and the platform can show one ad per unit of time. Thus, n′(u) > 0. Using Proposition 1
(1) yields:
Result 3. In the targeted advertising application with with n′(ui) > 0, data is unilaterally










Notice that because n′(ui) > 0, we also have
∂ri
∂ui
> 0, meaning that utilities are




In Appendix B.2 we provide a microfoundation based on using noisy signals about
consumers’ preferences to target ads. We derive the implied P (ni, δi) and show that
∂2P (ni,δi)
∂ni∂δi
= 0, meaning data is unilaterally anti-competitive in the model with ad nuisance
but pro-competitive in the model of competition for attention. Thus, the same inverse
demand for advertising can imply quite different effects of data depending on the exact
mode of competition. Our point in this paper is not to argue that data is UPC or UAC
when used to target ads, but simply to stress the modelling assumptions that drive such a
result. When ads create nuisance, increasing u means showing fewer ads. This is more
costly if δi is large (because the marginal ad is more valuable). Conversely, when firms
compete for attention a higher u means consumers spend more time on the platform. This
is more beneficial the larger is δi (because each unit of attention can be more precisely
matched with an ad).
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3.3 Price-discrimination
Armstrong and Vickers (2001) use the competition-in-utility framework to study com-
petitive price-discrimination. While most of their analysis takes place in an environment
of intense competition (so that the equilibrium is close to marginal cost-pricing), they
provide a condition analogous to ∂
2 ln[r(ui,δi)]
∂ui∂δi
> 0 for discrimination to benefit consumers
(their Lemma 3), and apply it to compare uniform pricing and two-part tariffs (Corollary
1). Here we revisit the issue of price-discrimination, by explicitly incorporating data in the
model. This allows us to study marginal improvements in the ability to price-discriminate,
as well as asymmetric situations.
Consider a model in which a consumer has a value for each of a continuum of goods
drawn independently from some distribution F . Each firm i sells its own version of
every good and has data that allows it to determine consumers’ willingness to pay for
a fraction δi of them (we call these goods identified) and thus extract as much of the
surplus as it wants. For the remaining 1− δi unidentified goods, the firm only knows that
consumers have demand Q(p) = 1− F (p) and can do no better than setting a uniform
price. Consumers one-stop shop, and the utility of choosing firm i is given by the standard
consumer surplus measure.
To develop some intuition, first consider the polar cases with δi ∈ {0, 1}. If δi = 0
then, given a target ui, the firm cannot do better than a uniform price for all goods. To
increase consumer surplus from area a in Figure 3 to areas a+ b+ d would require the
firm to cut price from p∗ to p∗′, causing a change in revenue of e− b. If, on the other hand,
δ = 1 then the firm is able to perfectly price discriminate and the sum of consumer and
firm surplus must equal the total area under the demand curve. Thus, increasing utility
from a to a+ b+ d would result in a change in revenue of −b− d. The opportunity cost
of providing utility is lower when the firm has no data. This suggests that data might be
unilaterally anti-competitive.
We develop this reasoning more formally in Appendix B.3. Denote the maximal social
surplus generated by a product as u (i.e. u =
∫∞
0
q(x)dx). We show that a firm wishing
to offer utility ui optimally provides as much of that utility as possible by lowering the
uniform price of the non-identified products rather than extracting less surplus from
identified products (if ui ≤ (1− δi)u then it can provide all of its utility in this way). This
implies an optimal set of prices (and thus an r) associated with any target utility level.
We prove the following result:
Result 4. Consider the equilibrium of the price-discrimination game outlined above.




2. If u∗j > (1 − δj)u,
∂r(u∗j ,δj)
∂δj
















Figure 3: Price discrimination.
While part 1 of Result 4 does not imply that data is unilaterally anti-competitive in




can check that this is indeed the case when q(p) is linear or has a constant price-elasticity.
Result 4 suggests that data is more likely to be anti-competitive when the initial
level of data is small. Indeed, for δj close to zero we necessarily have u
∗




< 0, while for δj close to 1 u
∗
j > (1− δj)u, which means that data ceases
to be anti-competitive.
3.4 Other applications
We can also apply competition-in-utility framework to other situations, including where
firms’ decisions are multi-dimensional (e.g. choice of a price and quality), where there
are network effects, or where consumers can consume from more than one firm (multi-
homing). We analyze such situations in Appendix B. The model works relatively well in
environments with multidimensional decisions or network effects, even though it sometimes
loses the attractive property that the pro or anti-competitive nature of data is independent
of the choice of the demand function. Regarding multi-homing, we provide an example
of targeted advertising with n = 2. Firm j’s revenue depends on δi and ui (because
advertising on j is less valuable if consumers can be reliably reached through i). We
show that the effect of an increase in δi on ûi is as above, while ûj shifts in the opposite
direction to ûi.
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So far in the paper, we have mostly treated data as an exogenous parameter. In order
to address some of the policy relevant issues surrounding data, we now embed the model
in richer frameworks where the quality of data available to each firm is an equilibrium
object.
4 Data-driven mergers
Many firms collect data as a by-product of their activity. At a basic level, customer lists
can be a valuable asset as they allow a firm to send personalized offers to its previous
customers. Interestingly, the customer list of a firm in a market can also be of value to
firms in another market, for instance if the products are complements, paving the way for
data trade opportunities. Alternatively, because the trade of data may be hindered by
various frictions (see below for a discussion), acquiring a company can be a way to put
a hand on its data. Several recent high-profile mergers, such as that between Microsoft
and LinkedIn or Facebook and WhatsApp, have indeed been partially motivated by
the acquisition of data. In the Microsoft and LinkedIn case, LinkedIn’s data could be
used by Microsoft to customize its Customer Relationship Management (CRM) software,
Dynamics 360.9 One should note that Salesforce, the leader in the CRM market, was
also reportedly interested in acquiring LinkedIn. Following the Facebook and WhatsApp
merger, Facebook has been in a position to use the data from WhatsApp to offer more
personalized advertisements, even though it initially claimed this would not be technically
feasible.10
In this section we build upon our baseline framework to study data-driven mergers.
We enrich the model by incorporating several key features of the relevant cases. We model
data as a byproduct of economic activity: the quantity (and quality) of data generated
by a firm is an increasing function of the usage of its product (on both the extensive
and intensive margins). In order to focus on the data-related aspects of the merger, we
assume that the merging firms operate on separate markets and are therefore not direct
competitors.11 We label the two markets A and B, and assume that data generated on
market A can be used in market B.12
Such a structure shares some similarities with a vertical merger case, in the sense that
a firm in a “downstream” market (B) obtains an input (data) from a firm in an “upstream”
9See https://www.reuters.com/article/us-microsoft-linkedin-idUSKBN17Q1FW, accessed 13
December 2019.
10See http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1369_en.htm, accessed 13 December 2019.
11While this assumption seems plausible in the Microsoft/LinkedIn merger, it is more controversial in
the Facebook/WhatsApp case, as both firms could be viewed as competitors in the market for social
network services. The European Commission considered that the two companies are distant competitors,
due to distinguishing features and consumers’ ability to multi-home. We discuss horizontal data-driven
mergers at the end of this section.
12For simplicity we ignore the possibility that data generated on B could be used on A as well.
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market (A), and competition authorities have paid close attention to theories of harm
related to input foreclosure by the integrated firm (Ocello and Sjödin, 2017). There are
two main versions of such theories of harm: (i) after the merger, the firm with the data
will stop supplying it to its rivals in the B market; (ii) after the merger, the integrated
firm will gain exclusive access to the data, which will harm its rivals. While the two
theories rely on data being kept internally after the merger, they differ as to whether data
is shared before the merger. This point underlines a first difference between a data-driven
merger as we model it and a more standard vertical merger: as we argue below, in some
cases, regulatory or contractual frictions make data sharing between independent firms
impossible or impractical, so that the merger is the only way to share data.
The second main difference between our framework and a vertical one lies in the fact
that selling data is not necessarily the primary purpose of the firm in the A market,
and that the A and B firms may face the same consumers. We therefore argue that an
important aspect, which so far has been relatively neglected, is how the merger will affect
the behavior of the A firm (and therefore consumer surplus) in its primary market.
4.1 The model
Market structure Firm A is a monopolist on market A, and offers a mean utility
uA, leading to a demand DA(uA) and a per-consumer revenue rA(uA). Let πA(uA) ≡
rA(uA)DA(uA) − CA(uA). Serving consumers on its primary market allows firm A to
collect a quantity of data δA ≡ δ(uA), with δ′(uA) > 0. Thereafter we operate a change
of variables and say that firm A directly chooses a quantity of data δA, corresponding
to a utility level uA(δA), with u
′
A(δA) > 0. Firm A’s profit on its primary market is
πA(δA) ≡ πA(uA(δA)), which we assume is quasi-concave and maximized for δ̂ such that
π′A(δ̂) = 0.
The data can also be used on a secondary market B, where two firms (B1 and B2)
compete. Competition on the B market takes the form described in Section 2: firms
offer utility level ui, i ∈ {1, 2}, resulting in a demand Di(ui, uj). We assume that A is
the unique source of data so that, if A transfers a quantity δi to firm Bi, the latter’s
per-consumer revenue is r(ui, δi).
13 We will mostly use the reduced-form profit expressions
πi(δi, δj) ≡ r (u∗i (δi, δj), δi)Di
(




− C (u∗i (δi, δj)), where u∗i denotes the
utility level provided in the subgame where the data levels are δi and δj.
Data trade We will consider two scenarios, depending on whether data trade between
two independent firms can happen. As we will show, this is actually a critical determinant
of whether the merger is likely to benefit consumers.
13Another equivalent interpretation is that the B firms start with the same level of data, and δi
measures the additional data provided by A.
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Data is a non-rival but excludable good: when data trade is possible, firm A can
choose to sell any vector (δ1, δ2) ∈ [0, δA]× [0, δA],14 in exchange for payments T1 and T2.
The trade mechanism consists in simultaneous take-it-or-leave-it public offers (δ1, T1) and
(δ2, T2) made by firm A,
15 followed by simultaneous public acceptance decisions by the
B-firms.
Extra assumptions and notations On the B market, we assume that the ui’s are




> 0. These assumptions entail a loss of generality. In particular, the second
one rules out situations where an increase in δi would lead firm Bj to compete so much
more fiercely that Bi would prefer to commit not to use the data.
Timing The game proceeds as follows: At t = 1, firm A chooses δA. At t = 2 data
trade takes place when possible. At t = 3 the firms in market B observe δ1 and δ2 and
choose their utility offers.
4.2 Merger when data trade is not possible
Several factors may make data trade between independent firms impractical. For instance,
privacy regulations may prevent firms from sharing personal data with third parties. By
contrast, a merger may facilitate information sharing within two divisions of a firm, as the
following quote from the UK Competition and Markets Authority suggests: “The GDPR
makes gaining and managing consent within a ‘walled garden’ to deliver a particular
purpose, either within an undertaking, or group of undertakings in common control, an
easier exercise than sharing data between undertakings to deliver the same purpose.”17
Another possible friction has to do with moral hazard regarding data protection.
Suppose that company A licenses its customer data to another firm, B. If B does not
undertake the appropriate level of investment in cyber-security, or if it uses the data in a
fraudulent way itself, consumers may blame company A in case of a breach, which would
deter A from licensing the data.18 With a merger, B would internalize the value of A’s
reputation and invest accordingly, making data sharing possible.
14Whether the data is sold, temporarily licensed, or whether firm A merely allows B firms to send
queries to the database without providing the data itself is of no consequence in the model.
15The results would hold with Nash bargaining provided A has enough market power over the data.





report.pdf, accessed 12 February 2020. Note that in some jurisdictions mergers may not always allow
firms to transfer data internally. Recent calls for “data Chinese walls” within companies would also
complicate matters.
18The Facebook - Cambridge Analytica scandal is a good illustration of the drawbacks of licensing data
to independent third parties. See https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/3/23/17151916/
facebook-cambridge-analytica-trump-diagram, accessed 13 December 2019.
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In our analysis, we thus consider the two situations: data trade without a merger can
either be possible or not.
Suppose therefore that data trade between A and the B firms is impossible absent the
merger. We assume that the merger allows the new firm to transfer the data between A
and B1. We compare the equilibrium outcome when firms are independent to the case
where A and B1 merge. We use a superscript I for the case of independent firms, and a
superscript M for the case where A and B1 merge.
Independent firms Given that trade is impossible, firm A focuses solely on maxi-
mization of its A-market profit. It therefore chooses to collect δIA = δ̂ by offering utility
ûA = uA(δ̂). Since the B firms have no access to data, they offer utilities u
∗
i (0, 0).
Merger At t = 1, firm A − B1 maximizes the joint profit of the integrated unit,
πA(δA) + π1(δA, 0). Given that
∂π1
∂δ1
> 0, in equilibrium δMA > δ̂.
Comparison The fact that δMA > δ
I




A, i.e. that consumer surplus
on market A increases after the merger. In market B, the merger results in firm 1 having
access to an additional δMA data. The effect of the merger on consumer surplus on market
B therefore depends on whether data is unilaterally pro- or anti-competitive.
Proposition 3. When data trade between independent firms is not possible:
1. If data is unilaterally pro-competitive, the merger increases consumer surplus on
both markets.
2. If data is unilaterally anti-competitive, the merger increases consumer surplus on
market A but reduces it on market B.
The merger allows data to find a new use in market B. This makes data more
profitable, leading A to induce consumers to share more data by increasing uA. If data
is pro-competitive, the use of data also induces B-firms to increase their utility offer
(Proposition 2.B), resulting in an unambiguous gain for all consumers. Such circumstances
therefore favour a more lenient merger policy. If data is anti-competitive, on the other
hand, the use of data reduces utility offers in market B and consumers’ gain in market A
must be weighed against this loss.
Of course, in the first case the merger will reduce firm B2’s profit and could potentially
lead to its exit. While undesirable in itself, this possible “efficiency offence” should
probably not be used as an argument against the merger.
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4.3 Merger when data trade is possible
We now turn to the case where data can be traded even without the merger. A first point
to look at is whether firm A finds it more profitable to offer an exclusive deal to one of
the B firms or to sell data to both. In the former case, its revenue from the sale of data
is πi(δ, 0)− πi(0, δ), while in the latter it is 2 (πi(δ, δ)− πi(0, δ)). Exclusivity is therefore
preferred when
πi(δ, 0) + πi(0, δ) > 2πi(δ, δ), (5)
which is a version of the well-know “efficiency effect” (Gilbert and Newbery, 1982). For
the sake of brevity we only present the results corresponding to this case (but discuss the
other case towards the end of this Section).







The amount of data collected affects the price of data through two channels: first, collecting
more data increases the profit of the data holder by assumption. Second, it also affects
the profit of the firm which does not obtain the data (firms’ outside option). The sign of
this effect depends on whether data is unilaterally pro- or anticompetitive. Indeed, if data




The reverse holds when data is anti-competitive.
If A and B1 merge, A still has the option to sell the data to B2. However, such a
strategy is never profitable if exclusivity is preferred when A is independent. Indeed, the
price at which A−B1 would sell to B2 is π2(δ, δ)− π2(0, δ), but selling implies a loss in
profit for B1 of π1(δ, 0)− π1(δ, δ). Checking when the loss exceeds the gain yields exactly






After the merger, firm A−B1fully internalises B1’s profit and no longer needs to manipulate
its outside option, so the last term in (6) disappears.19
Comparing the first-order conditions (6) and (7), we obtain the following:
Proposition 4. When data trade among independent firms is possible:
1. If data is unilaterally pro-competitive, the merger leads to less data collection,
reducing consumer surplus on both markets A and B.
19After (but not before) the merger, δ is chosen to maximize A − B1’s joint profit. The merger is
therefore profitable.
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2. If data is unilaterally anti-competitive, the merger leads to more data collection,
increasing surplus on market A but reducing it on market B.
4.4 Non-exclusive deals
We have presented results for the case where (5) holds, i.e. where A, before and after the
merger, finds it optimal to not sell data to B2. But we obtain similar results when A’s
profit is maximized by selling data to the two B firms before the merger. In that case the
merger does not affect which firms get the data, because A−B1 still finds it profitable to
sell the data to B2. But the merger still changes the incentives to collect data through its
effect on the A−B1 negotiation: before the merger, A wants to reduce the profit that B1
would make if it did not buy the data, whereas such a force disappears after the merger.
We emphasize that, whether (5) holds or not, the number of B-firms supplied with
data is not affected by the merger. Thus, harms experienced by consumers are not due to
a foreclosure effect. Instead, the mechanism is that the merger changes A’s incentive to
collect data, resulting in different equilibrium utility offers in both market A and (via the
effect of data on competition) in market B.
4.5 Summary and discussion
A data-driven merger can affect consumers through two channels: by changing the
distribution of data (and intensity of competition) in market B, and by changing incentives
to collect data in market A. Combining Propositions 3 and 4: If data is unilaterally
pro-competitive, we find that surplus in markets A and B is aligned: the merger benefits
consumers in both markets if and only if data trade is impossible prior to the merger.
If data is anti-competitive then the surplus effects of the merger differ across markets:
consumers benefit in market A from better offers designed to generate more data, but are
harmed in market B where the extra data softens competition.
Policy implications If we focus on the case where data is unilaterally pro-competitive,
our analysis offers both an efficiency argument in favor of a data-driven merger (it enables
data uses in adjacent markets) and a new theory of harm (the merger reduces incentives
to collect data, leading to a lower utility in the primary market). In the model, the key
condition is whether data trade is possible absent the merger.
To what extent should authorities and courts use the existence of pre-merger trade
as a legal test for evaluating these arguments? Suppose first that market investigations
reveal the existence of such trade. Authorities should then obviously lend less credence
to the above efficiency argument. However, before accepting the theory of harm that we
have proposed, several conditions should be checked: (i) Firm A has market power on
the data market. Absent this condition, firm A would have no incentive to manipulate B
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firms’ willingness to pay; (ii) Data trade is an important part of firm A’s activity. Indeed,
the main driving force of our result is that the incentive to manipulate the price of data is
strong enough to affect A’s behaviour in its primary market; (iii) The value of the dataset
of firm A depends positively on the utility it offers to its primary customers. There are
two dimensions to this statement. The first, less controversial one is that a better product
should attract more consumers and therefore allow the collection of more data. Second,
collecting data should not be perceived by consumers as a major privacy violation (see
Section 6 for a discussion of privacy concerns in a model with endogenous data collection).
In the absence of pre-merger trade, and if there are no indications that such trade
might take place in the near future, it is important to identify the source of the friction:
a merger allowing firms to bypass regulations may undermine other public objectives,
and the efficiency argument should be given less weight. One could even interpret the
existence of regulations as an indication that the use of data does not increase consumers’
utility, an argument in favour of blocking the merger. If, on the other hand, trade of data
is hindered by other types of frictions, our analysis suggests that the merger is more likely
to benefit consumers.
Input foreclosure By studying a model with public contracts, we have shut down input
foreclosure concerns, whereby firm A would stop supplying data to B2 after the merger. In
practice, these concerns have been and should continue to be given some attention. Our
modelling choice reflects our desire to emphasize the novelty of our approach. Moving to
a secret contracting game à la Hart and Tirole (1990) would add a foreclosure dimension
to our model, without fundamentally affecting the other insights.
Notice also that in this setup, the one-monopoly-profit theory does not hold: the
merger is strictly profitable even with public offers. This is due to our assumption that
the choice of firm A takes place before the negotiation stage. Inverting the timing would
allow firms to replicate the merger with a contract.
4.6 Horizontal data-driven mergers
Some horizontal mergers can also result in competitors merging their databases, thereby
gaining further insights about consumers for instance. Our general model can be readily
applied to such a situation. Suppose that firms 1 and 2 merge in a market with n firms.
First, as is standard in horizontal mergers, unilateral “price” effects exert a downward
push on the merging firms’ best-response. Let δ′i be the post-merger quality of firm i’s
data. We presumably have δ′i ≥ δi for i = 1, 2. When data is unilaterally anti-competitive,
this further reduces the utility offered by merging firms, and the overall effect of the
merger is negative. When data is unilaterally pro-competitive, however, the increase in
δ1 and δ2 may offset the unilateral price effect, in the same manner that reductions in
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marginal costs due to synergies may make a merger desirable for consumers. The key
is of course that the increase in δ1 and δ2 should be large enough, i.e. that combining
the datasets of merging firms is very valuable. This will be true if data generates enough
economies of scale and/or economies of scope, an empirical matter subject to much debate
(See Chiou and Tucker, 2017; Schaefer et al., 2018; Claussen et al., 2019, for empirical
studies in various contexts).
5 Data and market dynamics
While the previous section analyzed a model where data generated in one market is used
in another one, in many situations data can be used in the same market in later periods.
Taking this into account introduces dynamic considerations that have been a recurring
feature of the policy debate around data. For instance, there have been discussions around
the potential for data-driven network effects to create monopoly situations, either by
inducing exit or by deterring entry (Furman et al., 2019).
In this section we present a simple model of dynamic competition involving data. Two
firms compete over multiple periods, and data generated by sales at date t can be used
in later periods. We look at properties of the Markov-perfect equilibria when firms are
impatient enough (or when the value of data is ephemeral enough). In particular, we are
interested in the question of market tipping: under which conditions can the use of data
by firms lead to a market structure dominated by a single firm?
Suppose n = 2 firms compete over many periods, t = 1, 2, . . .. Firms discount the
future at rate β. At the start of period t, firm i has access to data δti . If the utility offered
in period t is ut = (uti, u
t
j) then the per-period profit is
πi(u






We assume that (4) holds20 and that πi is concave in u
t
i.
Firm i accumulates new data from interacting with each of the D(uti, u
t
j) consumers it
attracts in period t, and may also be able to carry-over some data from period to period.
The quality of its dataset in period t+ 1 is therefore δt+1i ≡ f(Di(ut), δti), non-decreasing
in both arguments. Let
∂δt+1i
∂δti
≤ 1: data at least weakly decays over time (e.g., because





j) in each period. Thus, a firm’s value function has the form
vi(u
t, δti , δ
t
j) = πi(u





where Vi is i’s continuation value given the datasets it expects firms to start the next
20i.e. that best-responses cross only once in the static game.
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period with. We assume β is small enough that vi(u








Firms are myopic if β = 0. We say that the market tips in favor of firm i (in the long
run) if limt→∞Dj(u
t) = 0.
Proposition 5. Suppose either (i) data is transient, or (ii) firms are myopic. In a
Markov-perfect equilibrium:
1. if data is unilaterally pro-competitive, a firm with an initial advantage stays ahead
forever: δti ≥ δtj =⇒ δt+1i ≥ δt+1j .
2. if data is unilaterally anti-competitive, any initial advantage shrinks over time:
δtj ≤ δti =⇒ δt+1i − δt+1j ≤ δti − δtj.
If data is unilaterally pro-competitive then a firm with more data will choose to offer
higher utility and thus accumulate more new data than its rival each period, leading
to an entrenched market-leader. This is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for
data to cause market tipping. Whether data actually causes the market to tip also
depends on if the extra utility provided by the market leader causes its advantage to
grow from period to period. Suppose, for example, we take take our simplest product











. If data is transient, such that δt+1i = Di(u
t), then the
system has a single state variable, δt1.
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The market tips if and only if 3τ < v. If τ is small then demand is quite elastic and
the leader exploits its advantage to capture many more consumers, leading to tipping.
Likewise, a large v means that a little extra data gives a big advantage, again leading to
tipping. If, on the other hand, 3τ > v, a firm with an initial advantage will stay ahead
but see its advantage shrink over time, eventually converging to equal market shares.
When data is unilaterally anti-competitive, on the other hand, Proposition 5 is unam-
biguous: data cannot lead to market tipping. Intuitively, when data is anti-competitive
a firm with a current advantage in data offers lower utility and therefore serves fewer
consumers than its rival. This leads to the leader’s data advantage decreasing over time.
We therefore observe an interesting tension between static and dynamic competition
concerns related to data: it is when data is unilaterally pro-competitive (a static concept)
that long-run dynamics are most likely to foster competitive concerns.
21This is because δt2 = D2(u
t−1) = 1−D1(ut−1) = 1− δt1.
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Discussion Among the potential concerns that have been raised surrounding the com-
petitive effects of data, some are of an exploitative nature: exploitation of consumers’
cognitive biases (Scott Morton et al., 2019), price-discrimination (Autorité de la Con-
currence and Bundeskartellamt, 2016), or broader privacy violations (Bundeskartellamt,
2019)22. Others are of an exclusionary nature: risk of market tipping, data as barrier to
entry, refusal to supply, limitations to portability (Crémer et al., 2019; Furman et al.,
2019). In our framework, one way to conceptualize exploitative concerns is to model data
as being unilaterally anti-competitive: more data induces firms to offer less utility to
consumers. One message of the simple dynamic model presented here is that exploitative
and exclusionary concerns related to data cannot simultaneously apply to any given
situation. For instance, for data to lead to market tipping, it has to be unilaterally
pro-competitive.
This logic could also be applied to situations where an incumbent faces potential
entry. In such situations, data constitutes a barrier to entry only to the extent that it is
unilaterally pro-competitive. Indeed, a firm in possession of a large quantity of data that
it uses for exploitative purposes would be a soft competitor (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1984)
and would invite entry. When data is unilaterally pro-competitive, on the other hand, the
incumbent could strategically over-invest in data collection in order to deter entry. Such
investment would benefit consumers in the early periods (because collecting data requires
offering a large utility) while its later periods effect would be ambiguous (better product
by the incumbent, but less competition).
Notice that we are not claiming that market-tipping is incompatible with data being
used in exploitative ways, but merely that data cannot be the cause of market-tipping when
it is exploitative. For instance, in situations where data is unilaterally anti-competitive,
tipping might occur if the market also exhibits non data-related positive network effects.
Our results can be related to the existing literature. Hagiu and Wright (2020) show
that network effects arise when data-enabled learning can be applied across the entire
consumer population and can be translated into product improvements within the users’
consumption lifetime, or when across-user learning is combined with learning that is
consumer specific. Likewise, in Prüfer and Schottmüller (2017), a firm’s cost of innovation
is decreasing in its past demand. This generates an endogenous network effect through
increased investment incentives. In both cases, the positive network effects mean that
data is unilaterally pro-competitive and, consistent with our results, these papers show
that tipping is possible. Conversely, models with switching costs bear more similarity to
environments that are unilaterally anti-competitive. Indeed, such models tend to have
negative feedback effects because firms with high past demand charge higher prices. For
this reason, new consumers will often choose smaller entrants over larger incumbents,
22See Section 6 for an explicit modelling of privacy concerns. The points we make here would be valid
there as well.
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consistent with the lack of tipping observed in our model. See Farrell and Klemperer
(2007) for a discussion of such dynamic switching cost models.
6 Data collection with privacy concerns
We have so far focused on the competitive implications of data. However, a significant
part of the policy debate around data has revolved around consumer privacy concerns
and potentially exploitative practices related to the collection of individuals’ data—see,
for example, Bundeskartellamt (2019). Several regulatory options have been considered
or implemented (through the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation for instance):
restrictions on the type of data that can be collected, increased transparency regarding
data collection and usage (firms’ privacy policies are often quite opaque to consumers),
or a transfer of control to individual consumers (through consent mechanisms) or to
consumer unions.23
Privacy concerns enrich our baseline model through two conceptual novelties, which
we introduce successively. First, they can lead the revenue function r to be (locally)
decreasing in δi. In this context we study the effects of limiting data collection and
of imposing transparency to otherwise opaque policies. Second, a consumer’s privacy
concerns arguably only apply to what data about her a firm has, even though data about
other consumers might be used in the firm’s interaction with this consumer, leading to
the presence of externalities among consumers.
Because the effects that we discuss here are orthogonal to strategic interactions among
firms, we assume that the firm is a monopolist.
6.1 A model with privacy concerns
Suppose that δ measures the share of consumer characteristics that the firm collects (e.g.
gender, age, taste in movies, etc.). We introduce privacy concerns by assuming that
consumers incur a disutility γ(δ), where γ is increasing and convex.
If u is the (mean) gross utility offered by the firm (with corresponding revenue r(u, δ)),
the net utility is then U ≡ u− γ(δ). We write R(U, δ) for the per-consumer revenue as a
function of the net utility U and of the amount of data δ, i.e. R(U, δ) = r(U + γ(δ), δ)
The main difference with the baseline model is that privacy concerns may make R(U, δ)
decreasing in δ, as the following examples illustrate.
Example: product improvement Suppose that consumer have unit demand for the
product, and that the willingness to pay (ignoring privacy concerns) is v(δ). We then have
23Arrieta-Ibarra et al. (2018) and Posner and Weyl (2018) advocate for the notion of data as labor,
which we do not consider here.
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U = v(δ)−γ(δ)−pi, and, with a marginal cost normalized to zero, R(U, δ) = v(δ)−γ(δ)−U .
Whenever γ′(δ) > v′(δ), R is decreasing in δ.
Example: targeted advertising with nuisance If the firm shows n ads (sold at
price P (n, δ)), suppose that consumers’ net utility is U = v−kn−γ(δ). The per-consumer









can be decreasing in δ if γ′(δ) is large enough compared to ∂P
∂δ
.
For simplicity we assume that the fixed cost is constant, and that u 7→ r(u, δ) is
decreasing and log-concave. The firm’s profit can then be written as
π(U, δ) = R(U, δ)D (U)− C (8)
Let Û(δ) be the profit-maximizing net utility if the firm collects an amount of data δ.
We say that data is pro-competitive if Û ′(δ) > 0, and anticompetitive if Û ′(δ) < 0.
We have the following characterization:





Proposition 6 is the analogue of Proposition 1 with privacy concerns (and constant
fixed cost). The necessary and sufficient condition for data to be procompetitive is similar
to the the baseline model , i.e. given by the sign of ∂
2 ln(R(U,δ))
∂U∂δ
. However, the presence
of privacy concerns makes it “more likely” that data is anticompetitive in the following
sense: if data is anticompetitive absent privacy concerns, it will remain so with privacy
concerns, whereas data can be anticompetitive with privacy concerns but procompetitive
without. To see this, note that
∂2 ln (R(U, δ))
∂U∂δ
=
∂2 ln (r(u, δ))
∂u∂δ
+ γ′(δ)
∂2 ln (r(u, δ))
∂u2
By log-concavity of u 7→ r(u, δ), the term multiplying γ′(δ) is negative, meaning that




We now consider a game where the firm chooses both how much data to collect and
how much utility to provide. A typical complaint of consumers related to data is the
opacity of the system, meaning that it is difficult for consumers to know how much data
about them firms actually collect (and what they do with it).24 We make this our starting
point, and consider several policy interventions.
24For instance, Scott Morton et al. (2019) argue it would be “absurdly impractical” for consumers to
read the privacy policies of the many firms they interact with.
26
6.2 Restrictions on data collection, transparency
Suppose that consumers cannot observe the choice of δ, but can form rational expectations
δe. This opacity does not prevent the firm from generating revenue thanks to the data, but
it means that consumers’ participation decision only depends on their expected privacy
cost γ(δe). If we fix privacy concerns at γ(δe), we are back to the model without privacy
concerns and utility u− γ(δe), in which case the firm’s profit is increasing in δ.
Therefore the equilibrium is such that δ∗ = 1, which consumers correctly anticipate.
The equilibrium level of utility is given by the first-order condition ∂π(U,1)
∂U
= 0.
Let us study two possible regulatory approaches: restrictions on data collection, and
improved transparency.
Data cap Suppose that a regulator restricts the amount of data that firms can collect.
Formally, we model this with a cap δ̄ < 1 that the firm cannot exceed. If we maintain the
assumption of opacity, the cap is binding in equilibrium: δ∗ = δ̄. By definition we have
the following result:
Proposition 7. A cap on data collection improves consumer welfare if and only if data
is anticompetitive.
While trivial, Proposition 7 highlights that a cap is a fairly crude instrument, that
works well when data is anticompetitive, but that can backfire when it is procompetitive.
Transparency We now consider a different approach, focused on enabling consumers to
observe the firm’s data policy (how much data is collected, how it is used, etc.). Suppose
that the regulator can ensure that consumers observe and understand the firm’s data
policy (see our discussion below).
Under such a transparency policy, the firm solves maxU,δ π(U, δ).
Let (U∗T , δ
∗
T ) be the profit-maximizing strategy. In a second-best world, where the
regulator cannot choose U , how does the equilibrium level of data collection compare
to the one that would maximize consumer surplus? The next result identifies a class of






= 0, transparency achieves the second-best consumer surplus.
Proof. Starting from (U∗T , δ
∗
T ), suppose that we force the firm to change the amount of
data it collects by some ε. The firm will then choose to provide a different utility level.

















































= 0 is the model with product improvement and unit
demand (see above): R(U, δ) = v(δ)− γ(δ)− U . Notice that this example can be given
another interpretation: data does not improve the quality (which we denote s) but is sold
by the firm to a third party for a price v(δ)− s.
In such environments, transparency provides the firm with the right incentives: it
collects the amount of information that maximizes the surplus created by each transaction,
which then gives it an incentive to generate many such transactions by providing a large
net utility. Compared to a cap on data collection, transparency is “information light”,
in the sense that the regulator does not need to have detailed information about the
environment (i.e. whether data is pro- or anticompetitive) for the policy to be effective.
Transparency can also sometimes achieve the second best if it results in a corner





< 0 then the firm’s choice to collect as little data as






the relevant range then consumers benefit from the firm’s decision to collect as much data
as possible.
Unfortunately, the alignment of incentives between consumers and the firm is not
always perfect.





> 0 (resp.< 0), the firm collects
too little (resp. too much) data from consumers’ point of view.





= 0. From (9), we then see that increasing δ by ε > 0







Notice however that, compared to the default opacity regime, transparency is an
improvement even when it leads to too much data collection as long as δ∗T < 1. The only
case where opacity is preferred to transparency is when the latter leads to a large drop in






Discussion The model highlights a few messages that can be helpful in deciding which of
these two approaches (data cap or transparency) to prioritize. First, imposing limitations
on what data firms can collect (or use) can only be desirable from an efficiency standpoint
in the presence of a strong prior belief that data is unilaterally anti-competitive. The
important task would then be to identify which type of data is particularly likely to be
used against consumers, which may be difficult.
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Increased transparency, on the other hand, does not place such a burden on regulators.
Indeed the logic is to allow firms to effectively communicate the extent of their data
collection and use, allowing consumers to make a more informed choice. It provides more
flexibility than a cap: if data is UAC, transparency will induce the firm to collect less
data than under the benchmark, but not if data is UPC. Of course, this approach also
faces its own challenges. The main one is to make sure that communication is effective.
Consumers cannot be relied upon to read hundreds of pages of privacy policies full of
legalese. Requiring consumers to give their consent to cookie collection for each of their
visit to a website, as is currently the case in Europe, also seems to impose too much of a
burden on them. Our favored approach is one where firms’ policies would be graded on a
standardized scale (see e.g. Ramadorai et al., 2019, for a promising approach, documenting
in particular the heterogeneity of firms’ privacy policies), and where consumers could
specify an ex ante threshold on their browser. Websites whose policy clear the threshold
could be accessed without further action, but consumers would need to give their ex post
approval for websites with a less protective policy.
6.3 Data externalities and control
Let us now explicitly take into account the idea that, in order to generate “insights”
about consumer l, a firm needs data about this consumer but also data about other
consumers, for instance to predict her future behavior based on how consumers with
similar characteristics have behaved. Let ∆l ≡ g(δl, δ−l) be the quality of the “insights”
about consumer l if δl is the quality of the data it has about the consumer and δ−l is
the quality of data about other consumers (where we assume symmetry among the other
consumers). We assume that g is increasing in both arguments.
For a consumer over whom the firm has insight ∆l and to whom it offers utility ul,
the firm’s revenue is r(ul,∆l), increasing in ∆l. The privacy loss for consumer l is γ(δl).
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We consider a regime of individual control of data, where each consumer decides how
much data to share with the firm.
Proposition 10. If data is pro-competitive (Û ′(∆) > 0), individual control results in
too little data being collected by the firm compared to the second-best consumer-optimal
solution. If data is anticompetitive, individual control results in too much data being
collected.
The result is a straightforward implication of the observation that, when data is
pro-competitive (resp. anticompetitive), individual control of data results in a game of
25Under this specification, consumers dislike sharing their data, independently of how much data the
firm has about other consumers. One could also assume that consumers dislike the firm knowing or
inferring things about them, in which case the disutility would be γ(∆l). Our results would not change
under this alternative specification.
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contribution to a public good (resp. public bad): individual consumers do not internalize
the effect of their data sharing decision on others.
Compared to a situation where the firm collects the data opaquely, however, it is
clear that individual control is an improvement in the anticompetitive case but not in the
procompetitive one.
Discussion Other recent papers in the literature have identified some of the externalities
generated by disclosure of data. In particular, data about a consumer may be informative
about other consumers. Choi et al. (2019) show that this externality results in excessive
data collection in a setup with privacy-concerned consumers. Acemoglu et al. (2019) and
Bergemann et al. (2019) explore the consequences of this externality on the market for
data, and show in particular, in two different models, that it can result in a low equilibrium
price for data.
Our focus is different here: we do not look at the informational linkage between
users, but simply assume that data about users other than l allows the firm to generate
more insight about l. This could be because of a substitutability property: the firm
can learn something about consumer l simply by looking at other consumers, as in
the aforementioned papers; or because of a form of complementarity: data about l is
more useful if the firm also has some data about other consumers, for instance because
it can make recommendations based on the past behavior of consumers with similar
characteristics. In this environment, we argue that the externality may be negative (as
in Choi et al., 2019), resulting in excessive disclosure, but it can also be positive, the
implication being that giving consumers control over their data may result in too little
disclosure.
7 Conclusion
In a time of intense regulatory scrutiny around the digital economy, it is important that
debates take place under a certain conceptual clarity. When it comes to data and its
competitive implications, the multiplicity of models developed by economists might run
in the way of such clarity.
In this paper we propose another, complementary approach based on a competition-in-
utility framework. The flexibility induced by this approach allows us to analyze a variety
of policy issues (e.g. market structure, data-driven mergers, data collection regulations)
under a variety of scenarios regarding data uses (e.g. product improvement, targeted
advertising, price-discrimination). The key property of data in our framework is that it
allows firms to generate more revenue per-consumer for a given utility provided.
We show that in many cases the (unilaterally) pro- or anticompetitive nature of data
can be inferred from the properties of the per-consumer revenue function independently
30
of the demand function or of the competitive intensity, and illustrate the usefulness of the
approach using various examples. Whether data is pro- or anticompetitive in turn has
major implications, for instance regarding the evolution of market structure, an issue for
which we show that data cannot be anticompetitive in a static sense and simultaneously
lead to tipping or barriers to entry. When it comes to data-driven mergers, when data is
pro-competitive, a key condition for a merger to be desirable is that trade of data among
independent firms be severely constrained. In the domain of privacy regulation, policies
restricting data collection or granting individual control to consumers are desirable when
data is anticompetitive, but perform poorly when data is pro-competitive. Measures
fostering (effective) transparency provide more flexibility and may achieve the second-best
in setups where data can be either pro- or anticompetitive.
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A Omitted proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Part 1: The first two terms on the right-hand side of (3) are
positive: the demand for firm i is increasing in ui, and its revenue is increasing in δi.
Intuitively, having more data raises the incentive to provide utility, as the firm generates
more revenue from each extra consumer. The sign of ∂
2r(ui,δi)
∂ui∂δi
is ambiguous (see below for
examples). What we can say is that when it is non negative, we have ∂
2πi
∂ui∂δi
> 0, i.e. data
is pro-competitive.
Part 2: When C ′(u) = 0, we have ∂Di
∂ui






































2 ln (r(ui, δi))
∂ui∂δi
> 0




































The denominator is negative by (4) and the numerator is equal to (3), which is positive if
and only if data is pro-competitive.
Proof of Proposition 2.B. We find u∗1 as the solution to
ûi(ûj(u
∗
i ), δi)− u∗i = 0 (10)
(recalling that ûi is i’s best response function). The left-hand side of (10) is decreasing in
u∗i under (4). Suppose data is pro-competitive. The left hand side of (10) is increasing
in δi so u
∗
i must increase with δi (part 2). Part 3 then follows immediately from the
definition of strategic complements and substitutes. A symmetric argument holds for the
anti-competitive case.
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Parts 2 and 3 along with (4) imply that, starting from a symmetric equilibrium with
δi = δj, we have
∣∣∣∂u∗j∂δi ∣∣∣ < ∣∣∣∂u∗i∂δi ∣∣∣. Part 1 follows immediately.







, which has the
same sign as ∂
2ui
∂ui∂uj













which has the opposite sign to ∂r(ui,δi)
∂ui
.











= 0. Thus, firm i’s




















































is positive, and decreasing if (11) is negative. If firms are myopic then β = 0 so (11)



















= 0 so (11) again











. In both cases, ûti is increasing in δ
t
i if and only if











= 0, meaning ûti is independent of δ
t
j.
Summarizing, suppose that δi > δj and data is pro-competitive (anti-competitive).
Then i’s best response is shifted up (down) compared to j’s i and we can therefore use







To prove part 1 note that if data is pro-competitive and δ1 ≥ δ2 then both arguments
of f(Di(u
t), δti) are larger in the case that i = 1 than when i = 2.
To prove part 2 note that if data is anti-competitive and δ1 ≥ δ2 then we must
have D1(u
t) < D2(u
t). Combined with the assumption that
∂δt+1i
∂δti
≤ 1, this implies that
δt+1i − δti = f(Di(ut), δti)− δti is smaller when i = 1 than when i = 2.
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B Proofs and supplementary material for Section 3
applications
B.1 Product improvement with general demand shifting
Suppose that, if firm i sets a price pi, each consumer who picks firm i buys q(pi, δi) units
of its product, q being non-decreasing in δi. The utility that a consumer obtains from





Inverting this equation we obtain p̂(ui, δi), the unit price that delivers a utility ui. The
associated per-consumer profit, assuming a constant marginal cost ci, is
r(ui, δi) = (p̂(ui, δi)− ci) q (p̂(ui, δi), δi) ,
which is easily shown to be non-decreasing in δi for any utility level above the monopoly
one.
Equivalently, we could assume that data shifts each consumer’s inverse demand, so
that a consumer’s willingness to pay for a qth unit of product i is P (q, δi). We then define




(P (x, δi)− P (q, δi)) dx
and r(ui, δi) = q̂(ui, δi) (P (q̂(ui, δi), δi)− ci) .
Let us define the mark-up elasticity of demand:





= −P (q̂(u, δ), δ)− c
q̂(u, δ)∂P (q̂(u,δ),δ)
∂q
The proof of Result 1 consists in showing that ∂η(ui,δi)
∂δi




which is a sufficient condition for data to be pro-competitive for firm i (by Proposition 1
(1)).


















, we can write
∂r(ui, δi)
∂ui
= −1 + η(ui, δi)






By Proposition 1 (1), we know that ∂
2r(ui,δi)
∂ui∂δi
≥ 0 is a sufficient condition for data to
be pro-competitive.
Let us now show that ∂η(u,δ)
∂δ
≥ 0 in the four examples mentioned.










φ′(p̂(ui, δi)) + (p̂(ui, δi)− ci)φ′′(p̂(ui, δi)
]
(φ(p̂(ui, δi)) + δi)
− (p̂(ui, δi)− ci)(φ′(p̂(ui, δi)))2
}
which is positive if φ′(p) + pφ′′(p) ≤ 0.
(ii) If q(pi, δi) = δiφ(pi), then η(ui, δi) = − (p̂(ui,δi)−ci)φ
′(p̂(ui,δi))
φ(p̂(ui,δi))
and a similar calculation
to case (1) applies.









{∂P (q̂(ui, δi), δi)
∂δi









∂P (q̂(ui, δi), δi)
∂qi
+ q̂(ui, δi)




∂2P (q̂(ui, δi), δi)
∂qi∂δi
]}





is non-positive by the assumption that φ′(x)+
xφ′′(x) ≤ 0, and ∂
2P (q̂(ui,δi),δi)
∂qi∂δi
is equal to zero in case (3), and to φ′(q̂(ui, δi)) < 0 in case
(4), so that ∂η(ui,δi)
∂δi
> 0 in both cases.
B.2 Microfoundation for ad targeting with noisy signals
We can microfound the ad targeting technology described in Section 3.2 by supposing
the product space is a circle of circumference 2 with consumers and advertisers uniformly
distributed around its perimeter. If a consumer is shown an ad for a product located
at distance 0 ≤ ε ≤ 1 from their location, the consumer’s willingness to pay is w with
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probability 1− ε2, and 0 otherwise. For each consumer, platform i receives a noisy signal
about the consumer’s location and discloses it to advertisers. If, without loss of generality,
the consumer’s true location is indexed as zero then the signal is distributed on [−1, 1]
according to the truncated normal distribution with mean zero and standard deviation
1
δi










, where φ(·, 1
δi
) is the normal
PDF with mean zero and standard deviation 1
δi
and Φ is the corresponding normal CDF.
An advertiser located at x is willing to pay up to w (1− E[ε2|si, x]). If the platform
decides to sell ni advertising slots, the resulting price of an individual slot is given by the
marginal advertiser’s willingness to pay. That advertiser is located a distance ni/2 from












B.3 Price discrimination analysis
Let Ij,l be the set of products for which j observes l’s willingness to pay (j’s identified
products). For z ∈ Ij,l, let vz,l and pj,z,l denote respectively the consumer’s willingness to
pay for product z and the price at which firm j sells it to her. The mean utility offered








Because both firms can set personalized offers uj,l and ui,l to each consumer l, we can
consider each consumer as a separate market, and we now drop the l index for notational
convenience.
We decompose the utility uj in two: uj = U
I
j + (1− δj)uNIj . The first term, U Ij , is the
utility offered through identified products, while the second, (1 − δj)uNIj , is the utility
offered through non-identified products.
Let rI(U, δ) be the profit generated by the share δ of identified products if the associated









Let rNI(u, δ) be the profit generated by non-identified products if the expected surplus
for each one is u. We have







= (1− δ)(η(u)− 1) (13)
where pNI(u) satisfies u =
∫∞
pNI(u)




up elasticity” of demand.
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As a preliminary step, we have the following result:
Lemma 2. Suppose that firm j wishes to offer utility uj.
• If uj ≤ (1− δj)u, j optimally extracts all the value from identified products: U Ij = 0.
• If uj > (1− δj)u, all non-identified products are sold at marginal cost: uNIj = u− c.
Proof of Lemma 2. Suppose first that uj ≤ (1 − δj)u, and that U Ij > 0. Consider
the following reallocation of utility provision: firm i reduces the utility offered through
identified products by dU Ij = −ε, and increases the utility provided by each non-identified
product by duNIj = ε/(1 − δj), so that the overall utility uj remains the same. The










ε = η(uNIj )ε > 0, so that U
I
j > 0 cannot
be optimal.
If uj > (1−δj)u, having U I = 0 is no longer possible: selling all non-identified products
at marginal cost would not be enough to provide utility uj. But a similar logic to that
above implies that the first step is indeed to lower the price of non-identified products to
marginal cost, before starting to lower the prices of identified products.
Intuitively, providing utility is cheaper by lowering the price of non-identified products,
because of the demand effect that is absent on identified products (their price is always
below the consumer’s willingness to pay). As the desired level of utility grows, the firm
has to start lowering the price of identified products.
Armed with Lemma 2, we can now prove Result 4:
Proof of Result 4. Part 1 : When u∗j < (1− δj)u, we know by Lemma 2 that U Ij = 0
so that r(u∗j , δj) = r
NI(
u∗j
1−δj , δj). By (13),
∂2r(u∗j ,δj)
∂uj∂δj
is of the same sign as η′(
u∗j
1−δj ), which is
negative by the log-concavity of q. Part 2: When u∗j > (1−δj)u, we know by Lemma 2 that
uNIj = u− c and U Ij = u∗j − (1− δj)(u− c) so that r(u∗j , δj) = rI(u∗j , δ∗j ) = δj(u− c)−U Ij =
u− c− u∗j , which is independent from δj.
B.4 Multi-dimensional choice
Suppose that firms choose both price, pi, and quality, qi, at a fixed cost of K(qi). The
utility experienced by a consumer is U(qi, pi, δi), increasing in qi and decreasing in pi.
Inverting U , we get pi as a function: pi = P (ui, qi, δi). Profit is then
πi(u, qi, δi) = P (ui, qi, δi)Di(u)−K(qi).
We assume that K is sufficiently convex to make π concave in qi. The firm will choose qi
to solve





implying an optimal q∗(u, δi).
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∂ui
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This is analogous to (3).
By way of example, suppose that U(qi, pi, δi) = δiqi−pi, implying P (ui, qi, δi) = δiqi−ui.
Then (15) becomes [











which is satisfied so data is pro-competitive.
B.5 Model with network effects
Suppose that the mean utility that a consumer obtains from firm i depends on how many
consumers also buy from i. Let us assume that the value of these network effects is
α(qi, δi), where qi is the number of consumers who buy from i. The stand-alone value of
product i is Vi, and its price is pi, so that
ui = Vi − pi + α(qi, δi)
We know that qi = Di(ui, uj), and can use this fact to write
ri = pi = Vi − ui + α(Di(ui, uj), δi)
In this model, data is pro-competitive if ∂
2α
∂qi∂δi
> 0. For instance, we might expect this to
be the case if the network effects arise because consumers value a larger pool of potential
matches and data allows the firm to match consumers more effectively.
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B.6 Multi-homing
Suppose that two firms are advertising supported websites, and that consumers can
multi-home. Following Ambrus et al. (2016), let us assume that participation decisions
are independent, i.e. that consumer l visits website i if ui + εil ≥ 0, where εil is the
consumer-specific taste shock.
We use the ad nuisance model from subsection 3.2 in which n′(ui) < 0, with the
difference that advertisers only value the first impression on any given consumer. Let
Xi(δi, δj, n(uj)) be the probability that a randomly chosen ad at i is exclusive in the
sense that the ad matches the consumers tastes and j does not successully show the same
consumer a matching ad. X is increasing in its first argument and decreasing in the
second two. We assume that we can write ri(u, δ) = n(ui)Pi(n(ui), Xi), where Pi is the
price of an ad.
We know from Proposition 1 that an increase in δi causes i’s best response function to


































≥ 0 then an increase in δi causes a unilaterally anti-competitive response from i
and a unilaterally pro-competitive response from j.
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